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POLITICAL APPORTIONING IS NOT A ZERO-SUM
GAME: THE CONSTITUTIONAL NECESSITY OF
APPORTIONING DISTRICTS TO BE EQUAL IN'TERMS
OF BOTH TOTAL POPULATION AND CITIZEN VOTERAGE POPULATION
Timothy Mark Mitrovich
Abstract: After each census, state legislatures must redraw voting districts for state and
local elections. Each state legislature must perform this redistricting in a way that protects two
important citizen rights. First, each citizen's vote must carry equal weight. Second, each
citizen must have equal access to his or her representative. To this end, the U.S. Supreme
Court has held that all state and local electoral apportionments must result in districts with
equal populations. In Reynolds v. Sims, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment
requires all state and local electoral apportionments to result in districts with equal
populations. However, the Court has never defined what "population" state and local
governments must equally distribute to comply with this requirement. This has resulted in a
conflict among the federal circuit courts. Circuit courts that have addressed this issue have
articulated three primary approaches to state political apportionment: first, according to "total
population"; second, according to different types of "voter-population"; or third, according to
the state's choice of total population or voter population. This Comment argues that the
constitutional rights to both representational equality and electoral equality require that states
apportion state and local electoral districts that are equal in terms of both total population and
voter population. This Comment proposes that the U.S. Supreme Court adopt a "dualstandard" test in which both state and local electoral districts cannot deviate by more than ten
percent in terms of either total population or citizen-voter age population.

Every ten years state legislatures redraw their electoral districts. This
redistricting is done to protect two important rights-the right to have
one's vote given equal weight and the right to have equal access to one's
representative. These rights have been acknowledged by the U.S.
Supreme Court.! Under the "one-person one-vote" principle established
by the U.S. Supreme Court, state and local electoral districts must
apportion the population equally to comply with the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 However, the Court has not yet defined what "population"
state and local government must use to comply with the "one-person
one-vote" principle. The federal circuit courts that have addressed the
issue continue to disagree, each articulating a unique definition of what

1. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474,478-79 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
560, 568 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963).
2. See, eg., Avery, 390 U.S. at 479; Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 560,568; Gray, 372 U.S. at 379.
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"population" to use to apportion state and local electoral districts.3 While
some circuits require districts to be equal in terms of their voter
population,4 other circuit courts of appeal insist that the relevant
population to consider is the district's "total population." Voter
population bases generally attempt to exclude persons ineligible to vote.6
In contrast, total population includes all persons living within a given
area, including those persons who are ineligible to vote (i.e., aliens,
children, and non-resident citizens).' The disagreement over which
population basis to consider is really a disagreement over whether the
goal of apportioning is to ensure "representational equality" or "electoral
equality," because the population basis used to apportion is merely a
means to one of the two respective end goals.' Theoretically, using a
"voter-population" basis ensures that each vote will be weighted
equally,9 while using a total population basis to apportion districts is the
way to theoretically ensure equal representation. 0 This Comment
considers one form of voter population in particular: Citizen-Voter Age
Population, which includes only those persons in a district who are
eligible to register to vote."
When states apportion their districts to be equal in terms of only total
population or voter population, constitutionally questionable outcomes
may result. Apportioning districts to be equal only in terms of total
population could lead to vast disparities in the actual number of voters
included in each district. Such a result would violate the "one-person
one-vote" standard because actual votes in one district may carry more
weight than votes in a neighboring district. 2 However, apportioning
districts to be equal only in terms of voter population could also lead to
large disparities in terms of total population in districts that contain large
3. See Chen v. City of Houston, 206 F.3d 502, 526-27 (5th Cir. 2000); Daly v. Hunt, 93 F.3d
1212, 1214 (4th Cir. 1996); Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 772 (9th Cir. 1990).
4. See Garza, 928 F.2d at 781 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 775.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 781.
9. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
10. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
11. See discussion infra Part lI.A.2.
12. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560 (1964); see also Garza, 918 F.2d at 779 (Kozinski,
J., dissenting); see generally Scot Reader, One Person, One Vote Revisited: Choosing a Population
Basis to Form PoliticalDistricts, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 521 (1994).
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numbers of people ineligible to vote. Such a disparity could result in that
district's population having such limited access to the political process
that their Fourteenth Amendment rights also would be violated. 3
The federal circuit courts are in conflict on this issue. In the Ninth
Circuit, states must apportion according to total population in order to
ensure representational equality. 4 In Garza v. County ofLos Angeles, the
Ninth Circuit held that the use of any standard other than total population
to apportion electoral districts would violate peoples' right to equal
representation under the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 The Garza court's
primary concern was ensuring representational equality and equality in
the level of people's access to their representatives. 6 The Garza dissent,
however, focused on ensuring electoral equality by apportioning using
voter population. 7 Most recently, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have held
that states have the discretion to choose which population base to
consider for apportioning.' 8 In Daly v. Hunt 9 and Chen v. City of
Houston,20 the Fourth and Fifth Circuits upheld the use of total
population as an apportioning standard and held that the choice among
population standards should be left to the states.2
The U.S. Supreme Court should address the conflict between the
federal circuits to aid states who are currently attempting to apportion
electoral districts based on the 2000 Census. Justice Thomas recognized
this need in his dissent from the Court's denial of the petition for writ of
certiorari for Chen v. City of Houston.' " Justice Thomas emphasized the
conflict between the circuits and, more importantly, states' need for
guidance when choosing what population basis to use.'
This Comment proposes an apportioning standard for state and local
electoral districts that meets the demands of the Fourteenth Amendment

13. See Garza, 918 F.2d at 775.
14. See id. at 774-75.
15. See id. at 775.
16. See id.
17. Seeid.at 780.
18. See Daly v. Hunt, 93 F.3d 1212, 1227 (4th Cir. 1996); Chen v. City of Houston, 206 F.3d 502,
523 (5th Cir. 2000).
19. 93 F.3d 1212 (4thCir. 1996).
20. 206 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 2000).
21. Chen, 206 F.3d at 523; Daly, 93 F.3d at 1227.
22. Chen v. City of Houston, 532 U.S. 1046, 1046 (2001) (mem.).

23. See id. at 2021.
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regardless of the demographics of a given state. Part I discusses the
history behind the "one-person one-vote" principle. Part II discusses the
U.S. Supreme Court's inadequate definition of what "population" states
must use to meet the "one-person one-vote" standard and the resulting
conflict in the circuits over the appropriate method to use. Part III argues
that States must apportion districts so that they do not deviate by more
than ten percent in terms of either voter population or total population in
order to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment.2 4
I.

HISTORY OF "ONE-PERSON ONE-VOTE" PRINCIPLE

A.

The Foundationof the "One-Person One- Vote'"Principle

The issue of how to apportion districts consistent with the Constitution
originally arose in the U.S. Supreme Court because of disparities in
populations between electoral districts in many states.25 These disparities
generally arose out of legislators' desires to maintain traditional political
subdivisions despite changing demographics, weaken the political
influence of racial minorities, or give equal or greater political influence
27 the Court set
to rural interests. 6 In Baker v. Carr,
the stage for its later
apportionment decisions by ruling that a challenge to a state's
apportionment scheme did not constitute a political question. 8
In Gray v. Sanders,29 the Supreme Court laid the groundwork for its
future holding in Reynolds v. Sims 30 by holding that the Constitution
demands that each person's vote count equally and that districts be
apportioned according to equal population. 3' The Gray Court examined
the constitutionality of Georgia's system for counting votes in primary

24. See Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 842-43 (1983); Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73,
92-95 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560, 568 (1964); Carl Goldfarb, Allocating the Local
Apportionment Pie: What PortionforResident Aliens?, 104 YALE L.J. 1441, 1456 (1995).
25. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 3 (1964); Gray v. Sanders 372 U.S. 368, 370 (1963);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 230 (1962).
26. See Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 3; Gray, 372 U.S. at 370; Baker, 369 U.S. at 230; see also
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 532 (1969); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960).
27. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
28. Baker, 369 U.S. at 188.
29. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
30. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
31. Gray, 372 U.S. at 379.
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elections for the lower house of their state legislature. 2 The Georgia
system gave greater weight to the votes of rural voters than urban
voters. 33 As a result, rural voters were able to elect more state
representatives than they should have been allowed given their
percentage of the state population. 34 The Court found that the system was
unconstitutional because urban votes did not carry the same weight as
rural votes.
The next year, in Wesbeny v. Sanders,36 the Supreme Court held that
in order to properly apportion federal electoral districts, each
congressional district must contain equal populations in order to balance
the weight of each person's vote and ensure equal representation. 7 The
Court declared that "[t]he command of Art. I, & 2 ... [is] that as nearly
as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth
as much as another's." ' The Court also recognized that the original
intent of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention was to create
equal representation for equal numbers of people.39 One delegate that the
Court specifically referred to was James Wilson, a member of the
Constitutional Convention and later a U.S. Supreme Court Justice, who
stressed the importance of both voting equality and representational
equality.4" Wilson believed that "[a]ll elections ought to be equal.
Elections are equal, when a given number of citizens, in one part of the
state, choose as many representatives, as are chosen by the same number
of citizens, in any other part of the state."'" The Wesberry Court also
found persuasive Wilson's statement that "equal numbers of people
ought to have an equal [number] of representatives."4 2 Therefore, by the
mid-1960s the Court had articulated a constitutional standard of equality.

32. 372 U.S. 368, 370 (1963).
33. Id. at 370.
34. Id. at 370-71.
35. Id. at 379.
36. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
37. Id. at 14.
38. Id. at 7-8.
39. Id. at 10-11, 18.
40. Id. at 10-11, 17.
41. Id. at 17.
42. Id. at 10-11.
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The "One-PersonOne- Vote" StandardApplies to State and Local
Elections

The U.S. Supreme Court, in Reynolds v. Sims"3 and Avery v. Midland
County," extended the previously established requirements of
representational and electoral equality to state and local elections. The
Reynolds' Court held that Gray's requirement that electoral districts for
primaries contain equal population numbers also applied to general state
electoral districts.4 5 The Avery Court then extended the Reynolds
requirement to local elections."
1.

Applying "One-Person One-Vote" to State Elections

The "one-person one-vote" standard applies to apportionments for
state electoral districts.4 7 In Reynolds, the U.S. Supreme Court
invalidated Alabama's plans to apportion the state's legislative districts
because the state used sixty-year old census data that resulted in districts
of significantly unequal populations. 8 The Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment's requirement that states treat each voter equally by giving
each citizen's vote the same weight, as articulated in Gray and
Wesberry,49 also applied to states and that to hold otherwise would
unconstitutionally result in a preferred class of voters.5 0 Consequently,
the Court held that in order to determine the validity of a districting
scheme it must look at whether there is substantial equality of population
among the districts established by a state legislature.5'
Although Wesberry dealt with federal congressional districts, the
Reynolds Court found Wesberry persuasive and extended Wesberry's
requirements to state electoral districts. 2 The Reynolds' Court held that
the Equal Protection Clause requires apportionments to be based on
equal population in order to protect "[t]he right of a citizen to equal
43. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
44. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
45. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 560.
46. Avery, 390 U.S. at 479.
47. See id.; Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 560, 568; see also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963).
48. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 543-45.
49. Id. at 560.
50. Id. at 568.
51. Id. at 559.
52. Id. at 560.
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representation and to have his vote weighted equally."5 3 In Reynolds, like
Wesberry before it, the Court tied its demand for "equal population" in
each district to its determination that the Constitution demands that each
vote be counted equally and that each person have equal representation. 4
The Reynolds' Court also emphasized the connection between the
right to vote and citizenship and suggested that few rationales, if any,
could qualify that right." The Court determined that a citizen's right to
vote can be impaired by diluting votes through unequal apportioning just
as severely as by prohibiting the right to vote altogether. 6 Furthermore,
to the degree a citizen's right to vote is impaired "he is that much less a
citizen."57 Any suggested system that weighs citizens' votes unequally
between districts is insufficient unless it falls within one of the few
permissible purposes of legislative apportionment recognized by the
Court." The Court has thus extended the dual requirements of equal
representation and equally weighted votes to statewide electoral
apportionment.
2.

Applying "One-PersonOne- Vote " to Local Elections

In Avery v. Midland County, the U.S. Supreme Court extended the
principle of "one-person one-vote" to local and municipal elections.5 9
The Avery Court heard a challenge to an apportionment plan for electing
county commissioners which resulted in considerable deviations between
the total populations of different districts.6" The Court noted that
governments, whether national, state, or local, must grant each citizen
equal protection under the law, and that this principle of equality applies
to any election for public officials.61

53. Id. at 576 (emphasis added); see also id. at 568.
54. See id. at 568, 579.
55. See id. at 567.
56. See id. at 555.
57. See id. at 567.
58. See id. at 566. One legitimate purpose the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized for state and
local apportionments is to maintain historic political subdivisions. See Brown v. Thompson, 462
U.S. 835, 842-43 (1983). However, apportionment plans in general cannot deviate by more than ten
percent. See Brown, 462 U.S. at 842-43; Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 326-28 (1973); infra Part

I.C.
59. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474,479 (1968).
60. See id. at 476.
61. Seeid. at481 n.6.
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62 the U.S. Supreme Court further
In Hadley v. Junior College District,
clarified the "one-person one-vote" principle by holding that it applies to
any popular election for a position that performs a governmental
function.63 The deviations in the election districts for school district
trustees in Hadley violated the Fourteenth Amendment, even though the
positions did not wield broad power.' Similarly, in Board of Estimate v.
Morris,5 the Court held that even local elections for positions that do not
wield any legislative powers are subject to the "one-person one-vote"
principle, as long as the officials are selected by popular vote.66 In
Morris, the elected positions at issue were positions on the board of
estimate for New York City representing the five boroughs. 67 The Court
reasoned that "the right to choose a representative is every man's portion
of sovereign power"68 and thus electoral systems should make each
citizen's portion equal. 69 After Hadley and Morris, the Court's "oneperson one-vote" standard has been applied to most state and local
election apportionment schemes.

C.

The Requisite Level ofPopulationEquality Demanded under "OnePersonOne-Vote"

After Wesberry, Reynolds, and Avery, the U.S. Supreme Court
established that the Constitution requires federal, state, and local
electoral apportionments to result in districts that contain equal
populations.7" However, the Court had not yet articulated how "equal"
the apportionments must be other than to say that the Constitution did not
require "mathematical exactness."7' As a result, several subsequent cases
dealt directly with the question of how large of a population deviation
between electoral districts is permissible under the "one-person onevote" principle. The Court has held that de minimis deviations are not
permitted for congressional districts, but state and local electoral districts
62. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).

63. See id.
at 56.
64. See id. at 51-52.
65. 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
66. See id. at 693.
67. See id. at 69 1.
68. Id. at 693 (quoting Daniel Webster in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 30 (1849)).
69. See id.
70. See supra Part I.A., Part I.B.
71. See supra Part I.B; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964).
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have more latitude.72 The Court has allowed large deviations under very
specific factual scenarios, but has held that state and local electoral
districts should generally not deviate by more than ten percent in terms
of population.73
74 the Court held that there was no deviation
In Kirkpatrickv. Preisler,
small enough to be considered de minimis when it comes to
congressional districts.75 In Kirkpatrick,the Court dealt with the issue of
exactly how large a deviation in population was allowable under the
"one-person one-vote" principle. 76 The plaintiff claimed that the six
percent population deviations between Missouri's federal congressional
districts violated the constitutional requirement of "one-person onevote. '7 7 Although the Court did not rule out the possibility that a state
could justify its deviations, it held that attempting to justify deviations in
congressional districts based on a desire to maintain traditional political
subdivisions is inadequate.7 s
In subsequent cases, the Court modified its holding by giving wider
latitude to state and local apportionments both in terms of the size and
reason for the deviations.7 9 In Gaffizey v. Cummings,0 the Court held that
the strict equality standard for congressional districting did not apply to
state elections.8 ' A deviation of roughly eight percent in Connecticut's
legislative districts did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 2 The
Court based its decision on Mahan v. Howell, 3 which permitted
deviations of over sixteen percent in state electoral districts when the
state's rationale was to keep historic districts intact.8 4 The Gaffney
72. See Brovm v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 842-43 (1983); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735,
741-42 (1973); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 327 (1973); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526,
530 (1969).
73. See Brown, 462 U.S. at 842-43.
74. 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
75. See Kirkpatrick,394 U.S. at 530.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 528-29.
78. Id. at 533-34.
79. See Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 842-43 (1983); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735,
741-42 (1973); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315,327 (1973).
80. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
81. See Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 741-42 (citing Mahan, 410 U.S. at 322).
82. See id. at 737, 739-41.
83. Mahan, 410 U.S. at 328.
84. See Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 742 (citing Mahan, 410 U.S. at 325).
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decision significantly helped to define the limits of permissible
population deviation for state electoral districts."
The Supreme Court further clarified the permissible population
deviation in Brown v. Thompson.86 In Brown, the Court established that
there was not a prima facie violation of the Equal Protection clause
unless the deviation between electoral districts was greater than ten
percent.8 7 Brown involved a challenge to a legislative district in
Wyoming with a deviation of eighty-nine percent in size from the other
districts in the state.88 The Court stated that deviations of less than ten
percent in the population of state legislative districts are insufficient to
establish prima facie discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment.89
The Court recognized that the deviation challenged in Brown exceeded
ten percent and therefore required that the state offer a justification. 0
Wyoming justified its creation of the smaller district, and the resulting
large deviation in population between that district and others, on the
state's desire to maintain historic political subdivisions along county
lines."
The Brown Court upheld the constitutionality of the district, holding
that a state's desire to maintain political subdivisions may justify
departures from population equality so long as that desire is "free from
any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination" and "there is no evidence of
'a built-in bias tending to favor particular political interests or geographic
areas."' 92 The Court noted that deviations may get so large as to be
unjustifiable.93 However, the Brown Court did not address that issue in
the instant case, because allowing the challenged district did not
significantly add to the substantial deviations that already existed in
Wyoming's apportioning scheme. 94 After Kirkpatrick, Gaffizey, and
Brown, the Court's demand for districts of equal population can now be
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See id. at 740-41, 749.
462 U.S. 835 (1983).
Id. at 842-43.
See id. at 838-39.
See id. at 843.

90. See id.
91. See id. at 841.
92. Id. at 843-44 (quoting Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964); Abate v. Mundt, 403
U.S. 182, 187 (1971)).
93. See id. at 845.
94. See id. at 847 (even without the challenged district "the average deviation per representative
would be 13% and the maximum deviation would be 66%").
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read to mean that state and local electoral districts must not deviate by
more than ten percent unless the state can justify the deviation.
D.

The U.S. Supreme CourtAssesses the Validity of a Chosen
PopulationBasis in Bums v. Richardson

The U.S. Supreme Court established in Reynolds and subsequent
cases95 that the Constitution requires states to create districts of equal
population. However, it did not decide what particular population basis a
state should use to achieve that end until Burns v. Richardson.6 The
Burns Court heard a challenge to Hawaii's use of registered voters as the
population basis for apportioning state legislative districts.97 The
plaintiffs asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment required states to use
total population as the basis for apportioning electoral districts.98 The
Court rejected this argument and ruled that Hawaii's use of a registered
voter population basis did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 99
One reason for the Burns Court's decision to permit Hawaii's use of
registered voters as an apportioning basis was its finding that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not specifically require states to use total
population.' First, the Court found no prior cases mandating the use of
total population to apportion electoral districts."' Second, the use of a
total population basis in some cases may result in a distorted distribution
of legislative power.'0 2
Although the Burns Court permitted Hawaii's use of registered voters
as the population base, it did so with multiple qualifications. One
qualification was that using a "registered voter basis" is acceptable as
long as it results in a distribution similar to that which would have been
reached had the state used another acceptable population basis. 3 A mere
showing that the distribution of legislators did not match the total
population did not disqualify Hawaii's plan because it still approximated

95. See infra Part I.B.2.
96. 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
97. See id. at 73-75.
at 90.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 91-92.
100. See id; see also Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735,746 n.12 (1973).
101. See Burns, 384 U.S. at 92.
102. See id. at 94.
103. See id. at 93.
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another permissible population basis.' Another qualification was the
Court's concern that using registered voters as the apportioning basis
could make the system susceptible to efforts to perpetuate the underrepresentation of certain groups in05 society by creating hardships for
certain groups in registering to vote.1
The Burns Court did not rule out states using a total population basis.
Instead, it suggested that there were multiple population bases which
could meet the Fourteenth Amendment's standards.0 6 The Court did not
give any guidance to states regarding how to determine when to use a
given apportionment standard, other than to say that state citizenship
may be one of multiple acceptable standards.0 7
In Burns, the Supreme Court held that courts should generally leave to
the states the decision concerning which apportionment base to use, and
consequently, which groups should be excluded from the apportionment
basis. ' 8 The Burns Court reasoned that the Constitution does not allow
courts to interfere with permissible state decisions,'0 9 "[u]nless [the]
choice is one the Constitution forbids.""' Thus, the Court qualified its
deference to the states by requiring that the state's initial choice be
constitutionally acceptable."'
II.

THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HAS NOT DEFINED WHAT
POPULATION BASIS STATES MUST USE TO COMPLY
WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF "ONEPERSON ONE-VOTE"

While the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Constitution requires
populations to be apportioned equally among electoral districts, and has
even defined that "equal" generally means a deviation in population of
no greater than ten-percent between state and local electoral districts, it
has failed to specifically define what "population" states must use to

104. See id. at 94-95 (the Court did not specify which population basis it was referring to).
105. See id. at 92-93.
106. See id. at 92-95.
107. See id. at 95.
108. See id. at 92.
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. Seeid.
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comply with the Constitution."' Justice Thomas dissented from the
Court's denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari in Chen v. City of
Houston,"' in order to voice his concern that the Court should hear the
case and finally answer this question."' Justice Thomas stated that the
Court had left "a critical variable" in the requirement of "one-person
one-vote" undefined by never clarifying what "population" state and
local governments must use to redistrict."' Justice Thomas added that the
Court had an "obligation" to resolve the issue," 6 citing the circuit split on
the issue" 7 and the upcoming redistricting based on the 2000 Census
data." 8
Lower federal circuit courts have articulated three different types of
population bases that state and local governments must use to apportion
their electoral districts in order to comply with Reynolds and the
Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that electoral districts contain
equal populations. The first approach, advocated by the Ninth Circuit, is
to use a "total population basis."" 9 Advocates of this position argue that
the true goal of Reynolds and the Fourteenth Amendment was to
guarantee equal representation for all persons, and because using total
population to apportion is the best means to equalize representation, it
alone must be used."0 The second approach, advocated by a dissenting
judge in the Ninth Circuit, states that electoral apportionments must use
some form of "voter population" basis.' This position stresses that the
true goal of Reynolds and the Fourteenth Amendment was to equalize the
weight of each person's vote, and therefore state and local governments
must apportion according to voter population to guarantee that each
district has approximately the same number of voters.' The third and

112. While the Court addressed the specific challenge to the population basis a state used to
apportion, it failed to articulate which specific populations were constitutionally permissible or
which standard State governments and lower courts should use to make such a determination. See id.
at 90-98.
113. See Chen v. City of Houston, 532 U.S. 1046, 1046 (2001) (mem.).
114. See id. at 2021.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763,775 (9th Cir. 1990).
120. See id. at 775, 781.
121. See id. at 779, 781-82 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
122. See id.
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final approach, adopted by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, states that either
standard meets the requirements of "one-person
one-vote," and that the
23
choice should be left to the individual states.'
Equalizing Total Populationto EnsureEqual Representation

A.

Apportioning districts so that each district is equal in terms of total
population ensures the principle of equal representation will be
achieved.12 The term "total population" includes "all persons" living
within a district, regardless of their eligibility to vote."z Creating districts
which include equal numbers of people theoretically means that each
elected official will represent the same number of constituents in his or
her district and that constituents will have equal access to their
representative.'2 6 On multiple occasions, the U.S. Supreme Court has
equal access to their
articulated that protecting peoples' ability to have
27
representatives is an important judicial concern.
1.

The Ninth CircuitEmphasizes EqualizingDistrictsin Terms of
Total Populationto EnsureEqualRepresentation

The Ninth Circuit, in Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 2 ' became the
first circuit court to render a decision dealing directly with the
constitutionality of a selected apportionment basis. The Ninth Circuit
held that the Fourteenth Amendment required the use of a "total
population basis."' 29 In Garza, a district court imposed a districting plan
on Los Angeles county that required apportionment using a "total
population basis."' 30 The district court's plan attempted to draw a
majority Hispanic district and was a response to an earlier suit brought
by Hispanic voters in the county who claimed that the County Board of

123. See Daly v. Hunt, 93 F.3d 1212, 1227-28 (4th Cir. 1996); Chen v. City of Houston, 206 F.3d
502, 523 (5th Cir. 2000).
124. See Garza, 918 F.2d at 781 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969); E. R.R. President's Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137 (1961).
128. 918 F.2d 763 (1990).
129. Id. at 775.
130. Seeid. at772.
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Elections had intentionally discriminated against them in redistricting. 3'
The County appealed, claiming that there was no basis for a suit because
no district with a majority of minority
at the time the district was drawn
32
voters could have been drawn.
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's plan based on a belief that
apportioning districts using a "voter population basis" would deny
persons ineligible to vote of their right to equal representation. 133 The
Garza court, citing U.S. Supreme Court precedent, stated that aliens are
"persons" within the Fourteenth Amendment and as such have a right to
equal protection which extends to political participation (short of voting
or holding office). 34 The Ninth Circuit also cited to the Court's statement
in Kirkpatrick that one goal of redistricting is to ensure equal
representation. 3 The Ninth Circuit additionally cited the statement in
Reynolds that "the fundamental principle of representative government is
one of equal representation for equal numbers of people.' 36 The Garza
court reasoned that if districts were apportioned based on "voter
population", it would be possible for a district with a large "total
population" to emerge that had considerably more people in it because a
large percentage was comprised of aliens and/or minors.137 This, the
Ninth Circuit noted, would result in the district's representative having
less time to provide assistance and to listen to his or her constituents'
right to equal
concerns, thus depriving those constituents of their
38
representation.
to
access
their
protection by diluting
2.

Historic Case Law Supportfor the Necessity ofEnsuringEqual
Representation

The principle of ensuring equal representation has significant support
in U.S. Supreme Court precedent, primarily in the Court's decision in
Reynolds. The rationale behind apportioning districts to have equal total
populations is that it guarantees that each state or local representative

131. See id. at 767-69.
132. See id. at 769.
at 775.
133. See id.
134. See id.; see also Goldfarb, supranote 24, at 1445.
135. See Garza, 918 F.2d at 775 (citing Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969)).
136. See id.
at 774 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,560-61 (1964)).
at 774-75.
137. See id.
at 775.
138. See id.
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will provide representation for an equal number of constituents.'39 The
Reynolds Court stated that "the fundamental principle of representative
government in this country is one of equal representationfor equal
numbers of people."'40 The Court also held that ensuring equal
representation is one goal of redistricting and a requirement under the
Equal Protection Clause. 4 ' A key component of equal representation is
the ability to freely access one's representative in order to articulate
one's positions.'4
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has upheld plans using total
population on multiple occasions,' and several circuit courts have
followed suit.'" In Burns the Court stated that "the Equal Protection
Clause does not require the States to use total population" and that total
population is not the only acceptable standard, but that the total
population method is one of many acceptable methods under the
Fourteenth Amendment.'4 5 Every circuit court that has addressed this
issue has upheld the use of a total population basis.'46 The Ninth Circuit
in Garza went so far as to hold that total population was the only
acceptable standard under the Fourteenth Amendment. 47 The Fourth
Circuit in Daly agreed that "total population 'is constitutionally
unassailable beyond question,"' but did not hold that it was the only
acceptable basis. 148 The Fifth Circuit in Chen agreed with the Daly court,
and held that total population does not violate the equal protection clause
139. See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 576; see also
Daly v. Hunt, 93 F.3d 1212, 1226-27 (4th Cir. 1996).
140. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 560-61 (emphasis added).
141. See id. at 565-66, 568. The Reynolds Court used the term "citizens," not "persons." Id. It
could be argued that the right to equal representation does not extend to aliens. See generally Scot
Reader, One Person, One Vote Revisited: Choosing a PopulationBasis to Form PoliticalDistricts,
17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 521 (1994). While this Comment does not focus on the extent of aliens'
Fourteenth Amendment rights, other U.S. Supreme Court case law suggests that, short of holding
office or voting, aliens are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Garza, 918 F.2d at 775.
142. Garza, 918 F.2d at 775 (citing E. R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc.,
365 U.S. 127, 137 (1961)).
143. See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 747 (1973); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S.
226, 531 (1969).
144. See Chen v. City of Houston, 206 F.3d 502, 523 (5th Cir. 2000); Daly, 93 F.3d at 1225;
Garza, 918 F.2d at 774.
145. Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 91-92 (1966) (emphasis added).
146. Chen, 206 F.3d at 523; Daly, 93 F.3d at 1225; Garza, 918 F.2d at 775.
147. See Garza, 918 F.2d at 775.
148. Daly, 93 F.3d at 1225 (quoting Ellis v. Mayor & City Council of Bait., 352 F.2d 123, 130
(4th Cir. 1965).
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and was an acceptable choice of population basis for states. 149 Therefore,
the U.S. Supreme Court has confirmed that the Constitution requires
equal representation and that state plans using total population to achieve
that end are permissible.
B.

Equalizing "Voter Population" to Ensure ElectoralEquality

A second method of apportioning districts gives each district an
equal number of voters. This "voter population" method furthers the
principle of electoral equality.15 ° "Electoral equality" means that each
person's vote is given equal weight, and is achieved by apportioning
districts to have roughly equal numbers of voters.'' The purpose of
apportioning districts to include equal numbers of voters is to comply
with the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that each person's vote
carry equal weight. 5 There are many different types of voter population
bases that states might use to apportion electoral districts, and thus the
persons included in determining population numbers varies according to
which type is used.
One type of apportioning standard used to equalize the weight of votes
between districts is the "voting-age population" standard.'53 This
standard includes anyone over the age of eighteen living in the district. 54
However, as the Fourth Circuit in Daly noted, using voting-age
population is not an accurate indicator of actual voting strength because,
similar to total population, it includes persons who are not eligible to
register to vote. 5
A second type of apportioning standard courts have approved uses
only registered voters as the apportioning basis. 56 Although using a
registered voter basis more accurately determines the number of people
likely to vote in the next election, the U.S. Supreme Court has expressed
concerns about this method. The Court upheld Hawaii's use of a
registered voters basis in Burns, cautioning that it did so hesitantly
149. See Chen, 206 F.3d at 523.
150. See Garza, 918 F.2d at 781 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
151. See id. at 781.
152. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 576 (1964).
153. See Daly v. Hunt, 93 F.3d 1212, 1227 (4th Cir. 1996).
154. See id.
155. See id.

156. See Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 82 (1966).
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because of the method's susceptibility to abuse by those in power "to
perpetuate underrepresentation of groups constitutionally entitled to
participate in the electoral process."' 5 7 A registered voter basis could be
manipulated by targeting more resources to increasing voter registration
among one voter demographic (i.e., Democrats or Caucasians) than
another voter demographic (i.e., Republicans or African Americans).
A third voter-based apportioning standard is the citizen-voter age
population standard (CVAP). 5 8 As the name indicates, apportioning
using this standard results in districts that contain equal numbers of
citizens of voting age.'59 Unlike a registered voter standard, a CVAP is
not based on a mechanism like registering voters that can be manipulated
by states. Instead, CVAP reflects the size of a population living in a
given area, similar to the total population standard. 6 ' CVAP is also a
more accurate representation of the number of actual voters in an area
than the voting-age population standard because unlike a voting-age
population basis, it only measures those persons eligible to register to
vote. '' In sum, of the three voter population standards, CVAP offers the
of potential voters while having the fewest
most accurate estimate
62
possible concerns.
1.

Using a Voter PopulationStandardto Ensure ElectoralEquality

Judge Kozinski, dissenting in Garza, argued that the Reynolds line of
cases, in conjunction with the Fourteenth Amendment, requires electoral
districts to consist of equal voter populations. 63 Judge Kozinski argued
that both the Fourteenth Amendment and Reynolds require voters to have
an equal influence in the electoral process, thus requiring each vote to be
weighed equally.' 6 Judge Kozinski noted that in most cases whether a
157. See id. at 92.
158. See Chen v. City of Houston, 206 F.3d 502, 524 (5th Cir. 2000).
159. See Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 780 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
160. See Burns, 384 U.S. at 92-93.
161. An apportioning standard concerned with equalizing the voting strength among districts
should probably also exclude felons from the count to get an even more accurate reflection of those
eligible to vote in a given area, especially in areas with large prison populations. See Richardson v.
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54-55 (1974) (holding that § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment permits states
to disenfranchise felons without violating the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause).
162. See supra notes 150-161 and accompanying text.
163. See Garza, 918 F.2d at 780 (Kozinski, J., dissenting)164. See id. at 779.
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state apportions districts using "total population" or "citizen voting age
population" does not make a sizable difference. 6 5 However, Judge
Kozinski highlighted the possibility that using a "total population basis"
can cause great disparities in the number of eligible voters between
districts, and consequently create disparities
between the districts in the
66
weight accorded to citizens' votes.
Judge Kozinski suggested that in prior U.S. Supreme Court
"apportioning" cases, the Court only used the term "total population"
because it did not foresee the possibility that the total population
standard may result in vastly disproportionate distributions of citizen
voters between districts.' 67 Judge Kozinski's opinion relied in part on
language from Reynolds and from Connor v. Finch,168 which according
to Judge Kozinski both suggest that the reason the Court sought to
equalize population was to equalize voting power. 69 According to Judge
Kozinski, in both Reynolds and Connor the Court reasoned that districts
must consist of equal populations so that each person's vote would carry
equal weight, thus seeming to indicate that the Court's primary concern
was electoral equality. 70 Judge Kozinski argued that if the goal was to
ensure electoral equality, and voter population is the only way to ensure
that goal,' 7 ' then using a voter population basis was necessary to comply
with the Fourteenth Amendment and Reynolds' principle of "one-person
one-vote."' 72

165. Seeid. at781.
166. Seeid.
167. See id. at 783, 784.
168. 431 U.S. 407,416 (1977) ("The Equal Protection Clause requires that legislative districts be
of nearly equal population, so that each person's vote may be given equal weight in the election of
representatives.") (emphasis added); see also Garza, 918 F.2d at 783-84.
169. See supranotes 167-168 and accompanying text.
170. See supranotes 166-167 and accompanying text.

171. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 746-47 (1973) (stating that the total population
approach is not an accurate way to ensure that a reapportionment results in districts that give equal
weight to each person's vote).
172. See Garza,918 F.2d. at 784.
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U.S. Supreme Court Jurisprudenceand the Historical
Understandingof Representative Government States that the
Constitution Requires ElectoralEquality

U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence demonstrates that one goal of the
principle of "one-person one-vote" is to achieve electoral equality by
equalizing the voting strength of citizens among each district. The
Reynolds' Court placed heavy emphasis on the importance of states using
apportionment methods that ensure each citizen's vote will be counted
equally in elections.1 3 In fact, the Reynolds' Court held that "an
individual's right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally
impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted,"' 74 and that
1 75
to the extent a person's vote is diluted "he is that much less a citizen."
In addition, the Reynolds' Court declared that few, if any, rationales
would be permitted for upholding a system that does not weigh each
citizen's vote equally. 176 The Court again emphasized the importance of
electoral equality in Hadley, stating that the Equal Protection clause
requires states to weigh each person's vote equally. 177 In Gray the Court
saw no constitutional way that a state may apportion districts so as to
evade the requirement of equalizing the weight of citizens' votes among
districts. 78 The Court in Wesberry proclaimed that "[n]o right is more
precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of
those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live.
Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined."'' 79 Thus, the Court has established that a state's foremost
priority in apportioning is to do so in a fashion that ensures each citizen
has equally voting power.
The U.S. Supreme Court has also considered historical evidence of the
framers' original intent that suggests the Constitution requires electoral
equality among districts. In Wesberry, the Court stated that "[o]ne
principle was uppermost in the minds of many delegates: that, no matter
where he lived, each voter should have a voice equal to that of every

173. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 576 (1964).
174. See id.at 568.
175. See id. at 567.
176. See id. at 566.
177. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 54 (1970).
178. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S 368, 381 (1963).
179. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (emphasis added).
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other." 8 The Reynolds' Court found James Wilson's statements
persuasive, and agreed that all elections must consist of an equal number
of citizens choosing an equal number of representatives.' Echoing the
Reynolds Court's emphasis on the connection between voting and
citizenship, the Court in Board of Estimate v. Morris, citing Daniel
Webster, stated that the right to vote is each citizen's piece of sovereign
power and primary means of political participation; therefore, each state
must ensure that its electoral system gives equal weight to each citizen's
vote. 2 The Fifth Circuit agreed in Chen, and noted that while the Equal
Protection Clause allowed for the use of total population it also included
a mechanism for punishing "egregious departures from the principle of
electoral equality."'3 Courts have therefore held that electoral equality
may be just as important a principle as representational equality, and
have recognized three main types of "voter population" methods. Of
those three types, CVAP provides the most accurate reflection of the
number of potential voters with the fewest concerns. 4
C.

The Choice of Which Apportioning Standardto Use is a Decision
for the States

Two circuit courts since Garza have addressed the issue of whether
states must apportion districts using "total population" to achieve
representational equality or use some form of "voter population" to
achieve electoral equality.' The Fourth and Fifth Circuits both upheld
the use of total population and held that the decision of what
apportioning standard to use is a decision best left to the states. 6 Both
courts relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's statement in Burns that the
180. See id. at 10. As the Court noted in Reynolds, these statements were not made in reference to
state elections, but rather to Article I, § 2 of the Constitution and the elections for the House of
Representatives. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 560. However, the Court relied on these statements in
Reynolds, saying that while Gray is not dispositive neither is it "wholly inapposite" because Gray
"established the basic principle of equality among voters within a State." Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 56061.
181. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 564 n.41. ("All elections ought to be equal. Elections are equal,
when a given number of citizens, in one part of the state, choose as many representatives, as are
chosen by the same number of citizens, in any other part of the state.").
182. Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 693, 698 (1989).
183. See Chen v. City of Houston, 206 F.3d 502, 526-27 (5th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).
184. See id. at 524.
185. See id.; Daly v. Hunt, 93 F.3d 1212, 1227 (4th Cir. 1996).
186. See Chen, 206 F.3d at 523; Daly, 93 F.3d at 1227.
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decision of which apportioning scheme to use, and consequently which
groups to include or exclude in the count, "involves choices about the
nature of representation with which we have been shown no
constitutionally founded reason to interfere. Unless [the] choice is one
the Constitution forbids."'8 7 Thus, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits do not
require any one particular method of apportionment, but rather leave the
choice to the states as long as the chosen method is constitutionally
permissible. 8
1.

The Fourth Circuit'sReading of the "One-Person One-Vote"
Standardin Daly v. Hunt

Daly v. Hunt involved a constitutional challenge brought by voters in
North Carolina to a districting plan for county commissioners and school
board officials that used a "total population basis" instead of a voting-age
population basis, on grounds that it violated the "one-person one-vote"
principle.'89 In Daly, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that where using one
standard cannot achieve both electoral equality and representational
equality, it should defer to the state's choice of how to apportion
electoral districts, and in doing so made a conscious decision to reject
both the majority and dissent's approaches in Garza.9 ' The Fourth
Circuit rejected the challenge to North Carolina's apportionment scheme,
and permitted the state to continue to use the total population method to
apportion their electoral districts even if it did not result in an equal
distribution of voters.' 9' One reason the court upheld the "total
population basis" was that in the past the U.S. Supreme Court had upheld
plans which used a total population basis to apportion. 92 The court also
stated that equal representation and electoral equality, which are
achieved through the use of total population and citizen voter-age
population respectively, are equally important constitutional concerns. 93

187. See Chen, 206 F.3d at 526-27; Daly, 93 F.3d at 1225 (both citing Bums v. Richardson, 384
U.S- 73,92 (1966)).
188. See Chen,206 F.3d at 523; Daly,93 F.3d at 1227.
189. See Daly,93 F.3d at 1214.
190. See id.
at1227.
at1227-28.
191. See id.
at1222.
192. See id.
193. See id.
at 1223, 1226-27.
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A related rationale of the Daly court was that federal circuit courts
should defer to the states because the choice of which population basis to
use involves issues that are inherently political and legislative in
nature.'94 The Fourth Circuit noted the Court's warning in Gaffney that
"federal courts should not 'become bogged down in a vast, intractable
apportionment slough, particularly when there is little, if anything, to be
accomplished by doing so.""" The Daly court reasoned that using a
"voter-age population" basis would not achieve the goal of "one-person
one-vote" any better than a "total population" basis.'9 6 Similar to using a
total population basis, apportioning using a voting-age population basis
would include many people ineligible to vote (such as aliens, nonresident students, military personnel or other transient persons, and
convicted felons).'97 Thus, according to the Fourth Circuit, using a voterage population basis would not result in a significantly better
apportioning of actual voters among the districts and would not achieve
true electoral equality. 9 In addition, the court cited its distrust in the
accuracy of census data for its conclusion that the choice between
population bases makes little difference because all apportionments are
based on somewhat inaccurate, outdated information.'99 Therefore, while
not going to the point of saying that issues concerning apportionment are
non-justiciable questions, the Fourth Circuit concluded that generally
courts should stay out of such issues.
2.

The Fifth Circuit'sReading of the "One-PersonOne-Vote"
Standard

In Chen v. City ofiHouston, the Fifth Circuit held that the use of a total
population basis was an acceptable apportioning method, but refused to
find that it was the only acceptable apportionment method and instead
concluded that states can choose which apportioning scheme to use. 0
The specific challenge in Chen concerned the electoral districts for the
city council, which used a "total population" basis.20 ' Although the Fifth
194. See id.
195. Id. (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735,750 (1973)).
196. See id. at 1227.
197. Seeid.
198. Seeid.
199. See id.
200. See Chen v. City of Houston, 206 F.3d 502,523 (5th Cir. 2000).
201. See id. at 505.
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Circuit upheld the use of total population as the apportioning method, it
flatly rejected the majority's opinion in Garza that districting plans must
include aliens in their apportionments. 0 2 The court based its rejection on
the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Burns which states directly that
states are not required to include aliens nor are they required to use total
population.2"3
However, the Fifth Circuit did not choose to follow Judge Kozinski's
rationale in the Garza dissent either, which argued that only a voter
population basis fulfilled the requirement of "one-person one-vote.' The
court did note that in its opinion "the numerical weight of references is
on the side of electoral equality. 20 4 The court also noted that section 2 of
the Fourteenth Amendment seemed to include a mechanism for
punishing "egregious departures from the principle of electoral
equality," which would lend weight to Judge Kozinski's position that the
Fourteenth Amendment's concern is with electoral equality.20 5 One
reason the Fifth Circuit did not find Judge Kozinski's dissent persuasive
was that U.S. Supreme Court case law is unclear on the appropriate
standard and often uses the term "population" to refer to either total
population or voter population. 2' Another reason was the fact that the
Court's language seems to argue for representational equality in some
places and then for electoral equality in others. 20 7 Furthermore, the Fifth
Circuit reasoned that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment appeared
to have considered both standards, but that there was no clear evidence
of a decision in favor of one standard or the other. 0 8
After examining support for both types of population bases, the Fifth
Circuit in Chen decided to follow the Fourth Circuit and held that the
209
choice of which apportioning base to use should be left to the states.
Having found no compelling evidence that established either total
population or voter population as the clear constitutional standard, the
court turned to the Supreme Court's decision in Burns for guidance and
adopted Burns' proposition that the choice of which measurement to use
202. See id. at 526.
203. See id.; Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 91 (1966).
204. See Chen, 206 F.3d at 525.
205. See id. at 527.
206. See id. at 525-26.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 526-27.
209. See id.
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is a decision with which the courts have no constitutional authority to
interfere unless it is clearly unconstitutional.2"'
In sum, the U.S. Supreme Court has thus left open the question of
which population basis states must use. In the absence of guidance from
the high court, the circuit courts have come to conflicting conclusions. In
the Ninth Circuit, states must apportion using a total population standard.
The Garza dissent argued that the Constitution requires that states
apportion using a voter-population basis. In contrast, the Fourth and Fifth
Circuits defer to a state's choice.2 What has emerged is a recognition of
the dual goals of representational and electoral equality, and an
acknowledgement of the methods used to achieve each goal.
II.

STATES SHOULD HAVE THE DISCRETION TO CHOOSE AN
APPORTIONING STANDARD THAT RESULTS IN
APPORTIONMENTS THAT DO NOT DEVIATE BY MORE
THAN TEN PERCENT IN TERMS OF EITHER TOTAL
POPULATION OR CVAP

Given the dual goals of representational equality and electoral
equality, how can states fashion an apportionment plan that meets both
important constitutional requirements? This Comment proposes that in
order to ensure both representational equality and electoral equality,
states must apportion districts so that they do not deviate by more than
ten percent in terms of either total population or CVAP.2" U.S. Supreme
Court precedent indicates that the Reynolds' "one person one vote"
principle was concerned with achieving both representational equality
and electoral equality.2"' Total population and CVAP apportioning
standards are the means to achieving both representational equality and
electoral equality, respectively. Allowing states to favor either
representational equality or electoral equality when deciding which
population basis to use to apportion their state and local electoral districts
is not a complete, nor constitutional, solution.1 As the following
hypothetical scenarios demonstrate, apportioning districts according to
only one standard can lead to unconstitutional deviations in terms of the
210. Id.
211. See id.; Daly v. Hunt, 93 F.3d 1212, 1227 (4th Cir. 1996).
212. See infra Part III.C.
213. See infra Part LI.B.
214. See infra Part JII.A.
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other standard.2 " Therefore, states should not be permitted to apportion
so as to achieve only one form of political equality, but must ensure that
their citizens have both electoral and representational equality. While
U.S. Supreme Court case law indicates that states have discretion when
apportioning districts, that discretion must be limited to apportioning
districts with deviations of less than ten percent in terms of total
population and CVAP.
A.

U.S. Supreme Court JurisprudenceIndicates that PeopleHave a
Right to Both Representationaland ElectoralEquality

Although the U.S. Supreme Court often appears to argue for both
representational equality and electoral equality when dealing with the
principle of "one-person one-vote," this language does not indicate
inconsistency, but reflects an understanding that electoral districts must
be apportioned to achieve both outcomes. 1 6 Lower courts have noted
that the Court's language often seems to contradict itself, or appears to
argue at different times for both representational equality and electoral
equality.21 7 Most often the circuit courts have rationalized this apparent
inconsistency by holding that either standard must be an acceptable
means for apportioning districts.21 However, a more accurate
interpretation is that while both standards deal with the issue of "political
equality" they are two distinct forms of political equality which need to
be fulfilled. 1 9 The Court has juxtaposed these rights within a single
sentence on more than one occasion. In Reynolds' the Court stated that
every citizen has a "right... to equal representation and to have his vote
weighted equally with those of all other citizens. ' 220 Later, in
Kirkpatrick, the Court noted that the principle of equal representation for
215. See infra Part III.A.
216. See SAMUAL ISSACHAROFF, ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURES OF THE
POLITICAL PROCESS 172 (2d ed. 2001).
217. See Chen v. City of Houston, 206 F.3d 502, 526 (5th Cir. 2000); Daly v. Hunt, 93 F.3d 1212,
1222-24 (4th Cir. 1996); Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 774-76, 781 (9th Cir.
1990).
218. See Daly, 93 F.3d at 1226-27; Chen, 206 F.3d at 526.
219. The Reynolds' Court alluded to the existence of "political rights" in a footnote that cited
Justice Douglas' dissent in MacDougallv. Green, which stated that the theme of the Constitution is
that citizens should have an equal ability to exercise their "political rights." See Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 564 n.41 (1964) (citing MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 290 (1948) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)).
220. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 576 (emphasis added).
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equal numbers of people was "designed to prevent the debasement of
voting power and diminution of access to elected representatives.""'
Such statements are evidence of the Court's intention that these two
standards not be seen as mutually exclusive, but as working together to
achieve the same end of political equality between citizens.
B.

Exclusive Reliance on Either a Total PopulationApportionment
Standardor a Voter-BasedApportionment Standard Can Result in
a Denialof ConstitutionalRights

Allowing states to apportion their electoral districts based exclusively
on either a total population or citizen-voter population basis may create
results that are constitutional as to one goal (i.e., representational
equality), but not the other (i.e., electoral equality). The U.S. Supreme
Court recognized in Gaffizey that, given the right set of circumstances,
the two standards can result in completely different outcomes.'m As the
following hypothetical scenarios demonstrate, when a state chooses to
apportion district populations only in terms of total population, districts
with vastly different numbers of voters may result. As a consequence,
voters in districts containing a larger percentage of voters would have
their votes unconstitutionally diluted, thus denying them electoral
equality.'m Conversely, when a state chooses to apportion districts only
in terms of voters, and in the process creates districts with vastly
different total population sizes, people living in districts with excessively
large populations would have their right to representation
unconstitutionally diluted as well.' 4
1.

Apportionment by Total PopulationAlone Can Result in a Denial of
ElectoralEquality

The use of total population in some contexts will result in outcomes
that violate the Equal Protection Clause. The first hypothetical scenario
consists of a state with some areas of extraordinarily large numbers of
residents ineligible to vote such as aliens or children, which decides to
apportion districts using a total population standard so that each electoral
221. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526,531 (1969) (emphasis added).
222. See Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 746-47.
223. See infra Part III.B.1.
224. See infra Part III.B.2.
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district is equal only in terms of people. The state determines that each
electoral district will consist of 200,000 people, and creates ten such
districts. However, upon comparison two of the districts have
substantially different demographics. District A is comprised of 200,000
people, but only 50,000 citizens who are of voting age. District B also
contains 200,000 people, but has 150,000 citizens who are of voting age.
Although these districts are equal in terms of total population, and thus
theoretically afford the constituents in each district equal representation,
the weight of citizen's vote in District A will be roughly three times
greater than the weight of citizen's vote in District B. The unequal
weight given to votes in these two districts would violate the U.S.
Supreme Court's requirement of giving equal weight to each citizen's
vote.2"
The Supreme Court has articulated on multiple occasions that states
must ensure electoral equality by apportioning districts so that each
citizen's vote is given equal weight. Beginning with Wesberry and
Reynolds, the Court stated that the weight of a person's vote must be
equal in each district.226 However, as the Court later noted in Gaffiey,
total population alone cannot guarantee the equal weight of each person's
vote. 7 The Reynolds Court stated numerous times that apportionment
plans that give unequal voting strength to different groups run contrary to
the Constitution's requirements for representative government.228 The
Court noted that each citizen has an inalienable right to participate in the
political process, and that most citizens exercise this right through
voting."' Therefore, to ensure effective participation, each citizen must
be given an "equally effective voice" in elections.3 The Court in Avery
reiterated that state and local governments must ensure that those
qualified to vote are given equal weight in the election process. 3 States
have an affirmative duty to "insure [sic] that each person's vote counts as
much, insofar as it is practicable, as any other person's.,,232 The
hypothetical apportionment plan discussed above violates the Court's
225. See supraPart II.B.2.
226. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S- 1, 17 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560, 568
(1964).
227. See Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 746-47.
228. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 559, 564-65, 576, 579.
229. See id. at 565, 576.
230. See id.
231. See Avery v. Midland County Tex., 390 U.S. 474,480 (1968).
232. See Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 54 (1970).
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mandate of electoral equality by creating districts consisting of unequal
numbers of voters. This type of apportionment does not result in electoral
equality because vastly different numbers of voters elect the same
number of representatives.
2.

Apportionment by Voter PopulationAlone Can Result in a Denial
of RepresentationalEquality

A state relying solely on a citizen-voting age population basis to
apportion districts could create districts that would deviate so much in
terms of total population that they would violate the Equal Protection
Clause. This second hypothetical scenario involves a state that also
contains areas with large pockets of residents ineligable to vote. To
achieve electoral equality the state decides that it will apportion the
population to create ten districts each containing 100,000 citizens of
voting age. However, two districts in the state are substantially different
in terms of total population. District A has 600,000 people within its
boundaries while District B only has 200,000 people within its
boundaries. All persons within a district are considered constituents and
may make demands on their representative's time. 3 Therefore, the
representative for District A will have three times as many constituents
as the representative for District B, and thus the people of District A will
receive less representation.
U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence has recognized people's rights to
representation and free access to their representatives. T4 As the Court
stated in Reynolds, "[t]he Equal Protection Clause demands no less than
substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens."235 A
key component of representation is access to one's representative
because "representation depends upon the ability of the people to make
their wishes known to their representatives" and, "interference with an
individual's free access to elected representatives impermissibly burdens
their right to petition the govenment." ' 6 As the previous hypothetical
scenario demonstrates, when a given district contains large numbers of
non-voters that were not considered in the apportionment, the demands
upon their representative's time may be so great as to violate all
233. See Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763,775 (9th Cir. 1991).
234. See Garza, 918 F.2d at 775.
235. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,568 (1964).
236. Garza,918 F.2d at775.
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residents' rights to representation and free access to his or her
representative. 2 7 All people living in such a district would receive less
attention from their elected official, and would not have the same ability
to influence the system as a district with fewer constituents. 3
Furthermore, as lower courts have pointed out, if an elected official's
ability to secure government benefits and services for their constituents is
in proportion to the constituents' share of governmental power, then
people living in districts with larger populations would likely receive less
than their share of benefits and services because their district would
contain more people but only have one representative lobbying for
39
them.2
C.

The Only Way to ProtectBoth ConstitutionalRights Is to Apportion
DistrictsAccording to Both Total Population and CVAP

As the hypothetical scenarios above demonstrate, using only one test
may result in unconstitutional outcomes. Therefore, the U.S. Supreme
Court should adopt a dual-standard test which would allow states the
discretion to choose any apportioning standard, so long as it creates
districts with deviations of less than ten percent in terms of both total
population and CVAP.240 States should have to apportion according to
the "dual-standard test for three reasons. First, it ensures that peoples'
rights to representational and electoral equality are protected. 4' Second,
it avoids the risk of unconstitutional outcomes when only one standard is
used. 242 Third, it is consistent with U.S. Supreme Court case law that has
indirectly used similar reasoning
to address the issue of how states must
243
apportion electoral districts.

237. See supra note 233.
238. See Daly, 93 F.3d at 1226; Garza, 918 F.2d at 775-76, 781.
239. See Daly, 93 F.3d at 1226; Garza, 918 F.2d at 775-76,781.
240. The U.S. Supreme Court has also placed other restriction on state electoral apportionments,
i.e., prohibiting political or racial gerrymandering. See generally Karcher v. Daggett, 467 U.S. 1222
(1984); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
241. See supranotes 216-221 and accompanying text.
242. See supra Part III.B.
243. See infra Part III.C.1.

1290

Non-Federal Political Apportioning
1.

The Dual-StandardTest is Based in Parton the U.S. Supreme
Court's Decision in Burns v. Richardson

The dual-standard test has implicit support from the Court's decision
in Burns v. Richardson. The dual-standard test achieves the necessary
specificity by explicitly requiring states to apportion districts to not
deviate by more than ten percent in terms of either total population or
CVAP, thereby ensuring that the apportioning scheme in question
protects people's right to representational and electoral equality. In
Burns, the court permitted the State of Hawaii to apportion state electoral
districts using registered voters as its basis,'" because it resulted in a
distribution similar to that which would have been achieved using a
different apportioning basis. 45 However, the court recognized that in
certain situations using one particular apportioning standard can result in
a "distorted" population distribution-a possibility demonstrated in the
hypotheticals above.246 The implicit principle in Burns is that in order to
guarantee the constitutionality of an apportionment scheme, the scheme
should result in apportionments that could result from multiple standards.
This reduces the possible inadequacy in some cases when only one
standard is used, and ensures that the multiple principles and rights those
standards are designed to ensure are protected as well. The dual-standard
test essentially adopts this principle from Burns, but requires that states
evaluate their apportionment scheme's results against the results that
would be obtained from using both a total population basis and CVAP
basis.
The U.S. Supreme Court should adopt the dual-standard test not
because Burns is incorrect, but because it is too vague. Although the
Burns Court suggested that courts can evaluate an apportioning scheme
by comparing its results to those that would be produced by other
"permissible standards," the Court failed to specify which apportioning
standards (i.e., what types of populations) courts and states must use to
evaluate an apportioning scheme's constitutionality.247 Justice Thomas
focused on this problem in his dissent from the denial for the petition for
writ of certiorari in Chen, arguing that a broad constitutional mandate to
apportion districts so as to have equal populations is not enough, courts
244. See Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 93 (1966).
245. See id. at 92-93.

246. See id. at 94-95.
247. See id. at 92-94.
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and states must know what specific population(s) to consider.248 The
dual-standard test achieves this specificity by explicitly requiring states
to apportion districts to not deviate by more than ten percent in terms of
either totalpopulation or CVAP, thereby ensuring that the apportioning
scheme in question protects people's right to representational and
electoral equality.
2.

A States 'Discretion in ApportioningDistricts is Not Unlimited

States have discretion to choose any apportioning standard so long as
it results in districts that do not deviate by more than ten percent in terms
of either total population or CVAP. The Fourth and Fifth Circuits held
that states were free to decide for themselves what standard they would
use to apportion their districts.249 The circuit courts based their decisions
on the U.S. Supreme Court's statement in Burns that courts should not
interfere with a state's choice of what apportioning standard to use. s°
However, the Supreme Court also held in Burns that such deference was
permissible only to the extent that the state's choice was not
unconstitutional.2 "' An apportionment scheme that does not ensure both
representational equality and electoral equality is unconstitutional as
would be a state's choice to use such a scheme."' Therefore, states
should have discretion to select any type of apportioning scheme, so long
as that scheme results in districts that are equal in terms of both total
population and CVAP. The fact that the Court even evaluated Hawaii's
apportionment method to determine if it was constitutional demonstrates
that states' discretion to choose between methods of apportionment is not
unlimited. 3 Furthermore, other Supreme Court decisions in the voting
rights arena suggest a trend that states' discretion in apportioning
districts is not unlimited due to the potential for political abuse and/or
manipulation. 4

248. Chen v. City of Houston, 532 U.S. 1046, 1046 (2001) (mem).
249. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
251. See Burns, 384 U.S. at 92-94.
252. See supraPart III.B.
253. See Burns, 384 U.S. at 90-98.
254. See Dep't of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 348-49
(1999) (Scalia, J., concurring); Burns, 384 U.S. at 93. See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000).
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3.

To Achieve "Equality" The Size of the Deviation ofState andLocal
ElectoralDistrictsShould Not Exceed Ten-Percentin Terms of
Both Total Populationand Voter Population

When using the dual-standard test to apportion electoral districts
equally in terms of both total population and citizen-voter age
population, states must ensure that the districts do not deviate by more
than ten percent. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged
that districts' population need not be identical,"5 and has stated that
courts should be somewhat flexible 6 the Court has also held that an
apportioning plan cannot be constitutional if it results in districts which
deviate by more than ten percent in population.7 In order to give states
the discretion and latitude they need to apportion according to the ten
percent standard, states may relegate the normal apportioning concerns
of shape, compactness, and traditional political subdivisions to the status
of secondary concerns."
IV. CONCLUSION
States should be given discretion in determining what standard they
wish to use as their basis for apportioning districts. However, the need
for a clear standard, the possibility of such discretion resulting in partisan
abuse, and the inadequacy of any one standard to fulfill both of the
constitutional requirements of representational and electoral equality,
demand that the U.S. Supreme Court take action. While the Court's
previous standard may have been acceptable in the past, modem
demographic realities in many states require a more precise standard.
Furthermore, given the right set of facts, no one apportioning standard by
itself can guarantee that both of the constitutional requirements of
representational and electoral equality are met. Therefore, states should
be required to apportion districts using the dual-standard test which
would require them to apportion electoral districts so that they do not
deviate by more than ten-percent in terms of either total population or
citizen-voter age population.

255. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964).
256. See id. at 577; Kirkpatrickv. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526,530 (1969).
257. Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 842-43 (1983).
258. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735,742-45 (1973).
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